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Sopwith went on talking... The soul itself slipped through the
lips in thin silver disks which dissolve in young men's minds
like silver... manliness. He loved it. Indeed to Sopwith a man
could say anything, until perhaps he had grown old, or gone
under, gone deep, when the silver disks would tinkle hollow,
and the inscription read a little too simple, and the old stamp
look too pure, and the impress always the same-a Greek boy's
head. But he would respect still. A woman, divining the priest,
would, involuntarily, despise.2
The men and women plaintiffs3 in Baehr v. Lewin are similar to the
woman in Jacob's Room. 4 Virginia Woolf's narrator, with her nose
pressed against a Cambridge classroom window, describes the
scribe inside pontificating with knowledge and authority, which is
at once coin and communion wafer, to his admiring flock of school-
boys. 5 The teacher, as "priest," mediates between his sacred texts
and the boys. 6 A male receiving the currency of the "silver disks"
respects the "priest" from whom value derives; a woman, for whom
the male-impressed currency of enlightenment and authority is
both unapproachable and foreign, unwittingly despises priestly
* M.A.R. in Philosophy of Religion from Yale University, 1989; B.A. with
majors in Philosophy and Religion from St. Olaf College, 1986; J.D. expected from
the University of Minnesota, 1995. The author wishes to thank Gary Strootman and
Professor Susan Wolf for their comments and criticisms, and his parents James and
Mary, whose marriage is a source of strength and inspiration.
t A week before this issue of Law and Inequality went to press, the governor of
Hawaii signed House Bill No. 2312 (Standing Committee Report No. 2777) which
attempts to legislatively overrule the effect of the equal protection decision in Baehr.
Please see postscript.
1. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
2. VIRGINIA WOOLF, JACOB'S ROOM, 40-41 (1922).
3. The plaintiffs in this case are Ninia Baehr, Genora Dancel, Tammy Rodri-
gues, Antoinette Pregil, Pat Lagon, and Joseph Melilio.
4. WOOLF, supra note 2, at 40-41.
5. This analysis of the passage by Virginia Woolf is offered by Christine Froula,
When Eve Reads Milton: Undoing the Canonical Economy, in CANONS, 149, 149-150
(Robert von Hallberg ed., 1984).
6. Id. at 150.
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dominance. 7 Value derives from the mind of the male scribe and is
passed on in the milieu of a classroom in which all but men are
excluded.8 For Woolf, that woman can "divine" for herself from
outside the sacred precinct of the classroom, challenges the
teacher's authority and his exclusive relationship as mediator of
value. 9
Woolfs representation of "man" as one who "respects still" the
teacher's cultural authority and "woman" as one who, "divining the
priest, would, involuntarily despise him," calls into criticism the
groundings, motives, and interests of the scribe's authority. This
definition identifies woman not by sex, but exposes the complex re-
lationship of woman to the cultural authority which has tradition-
ally silenced and excluded her. She resists the blind submission
which authority threatens to imprint upon her with the face of a
male.' 0
The plaintiffs in Baehr, as gays and lesbians, are similar to
the woman narrator in Jacob's Room because they stand outside
the sacred precinct of marriage looking in, divining the priest - in
this instance, the state." The plaintiffs in this case seek marriage
licenses, the state's legitimation of their intimate relationship, and
access to the valuable property rights which flow from marriage. 12
As homosexuals, they are excommunicated from the mystical au-
thority of the priest; their relationships are denied social validity.
These homosexuals, like the divining woman, refuse to submit to
the heterosexual values which the state imposes on them by deny-
ing sanction to their relationships. Like the narrator in Jacob's
Room kept from the classroom, they are kept from the state's altar
where authority flows, empowers and legitimates. Yet they are
there. Looking in. Divining the priest.
The Baehr court issued two rulings. First, Hawaii's Marriage
Law, HRS 572-1, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ha-
waii Constitution because the statute grants marriage licenses on
the basis of sexual classification; this denies gay and lesbian appli-
cants a marriage license because of the gender of their partners.' 3




10. Id. at 150.
11. John C. Lewin is the defendant in this case. He is the Director of the Depart-
ment of Health for the state of Hawaii. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993).
For the purposes of the commentary, the male judges deciding this case can also be
considered symbolic priests, conferring or denying cultural sanction and authority.
12. Id. at 48-52; see infra note 61 for examples of rights flowing from marriage.
13. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57-67 (Haw. 1993).
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and require the state to provide compelling interests with restric-
tions being narrowly tailored to meet this statute's objectives. 14
The Baehr court remanded this question to the lower court for find-
ings on the statute consistent with this ruling.' 5
In the second part of its ruling, the Hawaii court contrarily
held that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage.16
This comment offers a cursory synopsis of the Baehr court's
equal protection analysis. However, this comment does not under-
take a separate examination of the equal protection analysis of the
Baehr opinion. Analysis of this holding and its implications will fill
the pages of numerous other articles. Instead, this comment will
examine the fundamental rights ruling of Baehr. First, this com-
ment will show that the Hawaii court ignored significant U.S.
Supreme Court privacy rulings which suggests a contrary funda-
mental rights rule than that of the Baehr court. The Baehr court
gave no analysis to the substantive rules in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,17 Loving v. Virginia,'8 Eisenstadt v. Baird,19 or Roe v. Wade.2 0
Failure to consider these opinions in determining a liberty interest
leads to a spurious interpretation of federal privacy doctrine and
renders ignominious consequences to the individual plaintiffs who
seek enforcement of their civil rights.
Second, this comment will consider how the "traditions and
collective conscience" test used by the Hawaii court to deny funda-
mental right status to same-sex marriage is inherently prejudicial
and spurious as a means of determining fundamental rights. The
Baehr court employed the "traditions and collective conscience"
test,2 1 stated in Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold,
as the means of determining which rights are fundamental. 2 2 For
14. Id. at 62-63.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 57.
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993). Justice Goldberg observed that
judges "determining which rights are fundamental" must look not to "personal and
private notions," but
to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to determine
whether a principle is "so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as funda-
mental." . ... The inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such a char-
acter that it cannot be denied without violating those "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.". •
Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring) (citations omitted)).
22. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57.
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reasons expressed in Section III-B of this text, employing this test
privileges the cultural assumptions of dominant heterosexual val-
ues at the expense of the rights of homosexuals. This "traditions
and collective conscience" test assumes an easily accessible, univer-
sal history, unaffected by the prejudices of the one who redacts and
narrates it. History, however, is a matter of interpretation. Lesbi-
ans have a history, gay men have a history, African-Americans in
the South have a history, the Ku Klux Klan, Family First, and the
Moral Majority each have a history. The "traditions and collective
conscience" of our people is a panoply of struggles between these
groups and their "histories." What test determines which history
will be used to delineate liberty rights? As evidenced in Baehr, the
history of the dominant heterosexual majority is employed via the
"traditions and collective conscience" test to overpower, illegitimize,
and disparage homosexuals' civil liberty interest in marriage. Not
only is the history of the dominant culture's prejudice used against
the homosexual, but use of this "history" by the court legitimizes a
unitary theory of history from which the court superimposes cul-
tural assumptions of the majority on the creation of law. In effect,
by interpreting and redacting history through its heterosexual
value structure, the court creates history. This article's criticism of
the Baehr court's use of the "traditions and collective conscience"
test is both a refusal to accept the prejudice of the dominant hetero-
sexual culture and an attempt by this homosexual to wrestle the
articulation and creation of "history" relating to my gay brothers
and sisters from those who have not lived our lives.
Third, the fundamental rights analysis of Baehr is illogical in
relation to the equal protection ruling in Baehr. Fourth, an affirm-
ative rule upholding same-sex marriage as a fundamental right is
consistent with the debate on fundamental rights at the Hawaii
Constitutional Convention of 1978, and various Hawaii Supreme
Court privacy rulings. 2 3
Finally, denial of fundamental rights status to same-sex mar-
riage perpetuates stereotypes of homosexuals as not having the
same personal and sexual integrity as heterosexuals, which also
perpetuates violence against homosexuals. The denial of funda-
mental right status to gay and lesbian relationships renders gays
and lesbians non-persons. The matter of sexual identity is inher-
ently a question of personal identity. "Personhood" is a term which
captures an essential component of our being. A common thread in
privacy jurisprudence involves the "right to make decisions" which
23. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII 671 (1978).
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form the kernel of personal autonomy.24 The issue has been, which
of these personal choices are protected? The best answer the U.S.
Supreme Court has offered is that privacy rights are those which
protect individual decisions "important" to a person's destiny,25 and
the rights apply to "matters fundamentally affecting a person."2 6
The denial of these rights to homosexuals, as in Baehr, is an ex-
plicit refusal to recognize basic personal integrity of gays and lesbi-
ans. This lack of recognition of homosexual personal integrity
tacitly legitimizes societal prejudice and violence against gays and
lesbians. 2 7
II. Statement of the Case
The plaintiffs in Baehr filed a complaint on May 1, 1991 for
injunctive and declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, seeking: 1) a declaration that the section of
the Hawaii Marriage Law 28 enumerating the requirements for a
valid marriage contract is unconstitutional insofar as it is con-
strued by the Department of Health 29 to prohibit same-sex mar-
24. Jeb Rubenfield, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 751 (1989),
(quoting Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the
Constitution, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 454 (1983)). See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
25. Id. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977). See also Paris Adult Thea-
tre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 65 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
27. See infra text Section IV.
28. The Hawaii Revised Statute states:
REQUISITES OF VALID MARRIAGE CONTRACT. In order to make valid the
marriage contract, it shall be necessary that:
(1) The respective parties do not stand in relation to each other of
ancestor and descendant of any degree whatsoever, brother and sis-
ter of the half as well as to the whole blood, uncle and niece, aunt
and nephew, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate;
(3) The man does not at the time have any lawful wife living and
that the woman does not at the time have any lawful husband liv-
ing;...
(7) The marriage ceremony be performed in the State by a person
or society with a valid license to solemnize marriages and the man
and woman to be married and the person performing the marriage
ceremony be all physically present at the same place and time for
the marriage ceremony.
HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985) (emphasis added).
29. Hawaii Revised State Statutes Section. 572-5(a) (Supp. 1992) provides in rel-
evant part that "Wthe department of health shall appoint ... one or more suitable
persons as agents authorized to grant marriage licenses. . . in each judicial circuit."
Exhibits "A," "C," and "D," attached to the plaintiffs' complaint, purport
to be identical letters dated April 12, 1991, addressed to the respective
1994]
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riage;30 and 2) preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting
denial of marriage licenses based on sex-specific affiliations of the
couples. 3 1
The plaintiffs' complaint stated that: 1) The Department of
Health's interpretation and application of Section 572-1, denying
same-sex couples a marriage license, violates the plaintiffs' right to
privacy, as guaranteed by Article I Section 6 of the Hawaii Consti-
tution,3 2 as well as the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection and due
process of law, as guaranteed by Article I, Section 5 of the Hawaii
Constitution;33 and 2) the plaintiffs have no adequate or complete
remedy at law.34
The Director of the Department of Health, in his memoran-
dum to the court, stated that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted because: 1) the state's
marriage laws "contemplate marriage as a union between a man
and a woman;" 2) [as] the only legally recognized right to marry "is
the right to enter a heterosexual marriage, [the] plaintiffs do not
have a cognizable right, fundamental or otherwise, to enter into
state-licensed homosexual marriages;" 3) the state's marriage laws
do not "burden, penalize, infringe, or interfere in any way with the
[plaintiffs'] private relationships;" 4) the state is under no obliga-
tion "to take affirmative steps to provide homosexual unions with
its official approval;" 5) the state's marriage laws "protect and foster
and may help to perpetuate the basic family unit, regarded as vital
to society, that provides status and a nurturing environment to
children born to married persons" and, in addition, "constitute a
applicant couples, from DOH's Assistant Chief and State Registrar, Of-
fice of Health Status Monitoring, which state:
This will confirm our previous conversation in which we indicated
that the law of Hawaii does not treat a union between members of
the same sex as a valid marriage. We have been advised by our
attorneys that a valid marriage within the meaning of ch. 572, Ha-
waii Revised Statutes, must be one in which the parties to the mar-
riage contract are of different sexes. In view of the foregoing, we
decline to issue a license for your marriage to one another since you
are both of the same sex and for this reason are not capable of form-
ing a valid marriage contract within the meaning of ch. 572. Even
if we did issue a marriage license to you, it would not be a valid
marriage under Hawaii law.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44, 49-50 n.3 (Haw. 1993).
30. Id. at 48-49.
31. Id. at 49.
32. Id. at 50.
33. Hawaii Constitution Article I, Section 5 (1978) states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied
the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in
the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.
34. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51.
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statement of the moral values of the community in a manner that is
not burdensome to [the] plaintiffs"; 6) plaintiffs [as homosexuals]
. .. "are neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class and do not re-
quire heightened judicial solicitude"; and 7) even if heightened judi-
cial solicitude is warranted, the state's marriage laws "are so
removed from penalizing, burdening, harming, or otherwise inter-
fering with [the] plaintiffs and their relationships and perform
such a critical function in society that they must be sustained."35
The circuit court granted the state's motion for summary judg-
ment.36 The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, ruled that the cir-
cuit court's judgment on the pleadings was erroneously granted.3 7
First, the supreme court held that the circuit court made eviden-
tiary findings of fact outside the pleadings, on a motion for sum-
mary judgment.38 Second, the Supreme Court found that the
35. Id. at 51-52.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Id.
"A rule 12(c) motion.., for a judgment on the pleadings only has utility
when all material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and
only questions of law remain." Marsland v. Pang, 5 Haw. App. 463, at
475 (1985).
Based on the foregoing authority, it is apparent that an order
granting an HRCP 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings must be
based solely on the contents of the pleadings. A claim that is eviden-
tiary in nature and requires findings of fact to resolve cannot properly
be disposed of under the rubric of HRCP 12(c) Cf. Nawahie v. Goo Wan
Hoy, 26 Haw. 111 (1921) ... We have recognized that consideration of
matters outside the pleadings transforms a motion seeking dismissal of
a complaint into an HRCP 56 motion for summary judgment. See Au v.
Au, 63 Hawaii 210, 213 (1981); Del Rosario v. Kohanuinui, 52 Haw. 583
(1971); HRCP 12(b) (1990). But resort to matters outside the record, by
way of "[u]nverified statements of fact in counsel's memorandum or rep-
resentations made in oral argument" or otherwise, cannot accomplish
such a transformation.
See Au, 63 Haw. at 213; cf. Asada v. Sunn, 66 Haw. 454, 455 (1983); Mizoguchi v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Haw. 373, 381-82 (1983); HRCP 56(e) (1990).
Id. at 52-53.
38. Id.
Notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary record before it, the
circuit court's October 1, 1991 order granting Lewin's motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings contained a variety of findings of fact. For exam-
ple, the circuit court "found" that: (1) HRS § 572-1 "does not infringe
upon a person's individuality or lifestyle decision, and none of the plain-
tiffs has provided testimony to the contrary"; (2) HRS § 572-1 "does not
... restrict [or] burden . . . the exercise of the right to engage in a
homosexual lifestyle"; (3) Hawaii has exhibited a "history of tolerance
for all peoples and their cultures"; (4) "the plaintiffs have failed to show
that they have been ostracized or oppressed in Hawaii and have opted
to rely on a general statement of historic problems encountered by
homosexuals which may not be relevant to Hawaii"; (5) "homosexuals in
Hawaii have not been relegated to a position of'political powerlessness.'
... [Tihere is no evidence that homosexuals and the homosexual legisla-
tive agenda have failed to gain legislative support in Hawaii"; (6) the
'[plaintiffs have failed to show that homosexuals constitute a suspect
1994]
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circuit court's order, stripped of its improper factual findings, did
not support its legal conclusions. 39
The Hawaii Supreme Court then considered the right to pri-
vacy claim. The court ruled that at a minimum, Article I, Section 6
of the Hawaii Constitution incorporates4O the privacy right the U.S.
Supreme Court found and institutionalized within the penumbra of
the federal Constitution.4 1 The Hawaii court has held that "as the
ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to in-
terpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution, we are free to give
class for equal protection analysis under [airticle I, [slection 5 of the
Hawaii State Constitution;"...
Ultimately, our task on appeal is to determine whether the circuit
court's order, stripped of its improper factual findings, supports its con-
clusion that Lewin is entitled to judgment as a matter of law...
We conclude that the... unresolved factual questions preclude en-
try of judgment, as a matter of law, in favor of Lewin and against the
plaintiffs.
Id. at 53-54 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 54.
40. Article I, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution expressly states that "Itihe
right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest." The framers of the Hawaii Constitution de-
clared that the "privacy concept" embodied in Article I, Section 6 is to be "treated as a
fundamental right." State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 378 (Haw. 1988) (quoting Comm.
WHOLE REP. No. 15, IN 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITuTIoNAL CONVENTION OF HA.
WAIl OF 1978, 1024 (1980)). Id. at 55.
41. The specific guarantees, which in the Court's opinion created zones of pri-
vacy, were in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. The relevant
discussion in the federal cases reads as follows:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against quartering of
soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explic-
itly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizens
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to sur-
render to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
The Hawaii court, quoting the PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAWAII CONSTITUTONAL
CONVENTION OF 1978 stated:
More importantly, this privacy concept encompasses the notion that in
certain highly personal and intimate matters, the individual should be
afforded freedom of choice absent a compelling state interest. This
right is similar to the privacy right discussed in cases such as Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), etc. It is a right, though un-
stated in the federal Constitution, emanates from the penumbra of sev-
eral guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 625 (1983) (quoting Comm. WHOLE REP. No. 15, I
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978 1024 (1978)).
[Vol. 12:483
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broader privacy protection [under Article I, Section 6 of the Hawaii
Constitution] than that given by the federal constitution."42
The Baehr Court concluded that the issue of same-sex mar-
riage as a fundamental right was one of first impression, and "be-
cause there are no Hawaii cases that have delineated the
fundamental right to marry, this court, as we did in State v. Muel-
ler,43 looks to federal cases for guidance."44 The Baehr court looked
to Skinner45 and from that case concluded that the right to marry is
inextricably linked to the right of procreation.46 The court then
looked to Zablocki v. Redhail4 7 and determined that procreation is
simply the logical predicate to the fundamental right to marry.48
The court concluded that since only heterosexual couples can pro-
duce children, the federal construct of the fundamental right to
marry only contemplates marriages between men and women. 4 9
The court then considered whether it would extend the scope
of the federal construct of the fundamental right to marry. The
court decided to employ the "traditions and collective conscience"
test as defined and the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg in
Griswold.50 To determine what rights are fundamental, judges
look:
to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people" to
determine whether a principle is "so rooted [there]... as to be
ranked as fundamental."... The inquiry is whether a right in-
volved "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without
violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.' "51
Beyond conclusory assertion, the Hawaii Supreme Court gives no
reason why this test is determinative of fundamental rights.52 The
court made no analysis of this test and stated in one sentence that
42. State v. Kam, 478 P.2d 372, 377 (Haw. 1988).
43. 671 P.2d 1351 (Haw. 1983). "Thus, we are led back to Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Roe and appear to have come full circle in our search for guidance on the in-
tended scope of the privacy protected by the Hawaii Constitution." Id. at 1358.
44. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52 (Haw. 1993).
45. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a statute which allowed the state to ster-
ilize "habitual criminals").
46. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55.
47. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute that prohibited any
resident with minor children not in his custody and which he is under obligation to
support from obtaining a marriage license until the resident demonstrated to the
court that he was in compliance with his child support. Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court held that the statute burdened the fundamental right to marry).
48. 852 P.2d at 56.
49. Id.
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
52. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993).
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same-sex marriage is not rooted in the traditions and collective con-
science of the people of Hawaii; therefore, such marriage is not a
fundamental right.53
The Baehr court also concluded that the circuit court's order
was an improper construction of law regarding the application of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution to Section
572-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.5 4 The court concluded that
prima facie, and as applied, Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 572-1
discriminates against homosexuals because the state denies mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples on the basis of the applicant's
sex.55 Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 572-1 establishes a sex-
based classification, and according to Article I, Section 5 of the Ha-
waii Constitution, sex is a suspect category.56 When a regulation
makes rights, privileges, or penalties dependent upon a distinction
within a suspect category - in this case "sex" - that regulation or
law must pass "strict scrutiny" by a showing of "compelling state
interests" for making the distinction.5 7 Therefore, Hawaii Revised
53. Id.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, we do not believe
that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and col-
lective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions. Neither do we believe that a right
to same-sex marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the applicant couples do not have a fundamental
constitutional right to same-sex marriage arising out of the right to pri-
vacy or otherwise.
Id.
54. Id. at 57-63.
55. Id. at 67.
Rudimentary principles of statutory construction render manifest
the fact that, by its plain language, HRS § 572-1 restricts the marital
relation to a male and a female . . .Accordingly, on its face and (as
Lewin admits) as applied, HRS § 572-1 denies same-sex couples access
to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits.
Id. at 60.
56. Id. at 67.
[1It is time to resolve once and for all the questions left dangling in
Holdman. Accordingly, we hold that sex is a "suspect category" for pur-
poses of equal protection analysis under article I, section 5 of the Ha-
waii Constitution and that HRS § 572-1 is subject to the "strict
scrutiny" test.
See also Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164 (Haw. 1978) (ruling that sex-based classifi-
cations are subject, as a per se matter, to some form of "heightened scrutiny" be it
"strict" or "intermediate," rather than mere "rational basis" analysis).
57. Holdman, 581 P.2d at 1167.
[Tihis court has recognized that laws classifying on the basis of suspect
categories or impinging upon fundamental rights expressly or impliedly
granted by the Constitution are presumed to be unconstitutional unless




Statutes Section 572-1 is presumed unconstitutional unless the De-
partment of Health as an office of the State of Hawaii can show that
the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state
interests and the statute is narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary
abridgments of the applicant couple's constitutional rights.58 Sec-
tions 572-559 and 572-660o of the Hawaii Revised Statutes grant the
Department of Health exclusive authority to issue marriage
licenses. The court concluded that the Department of Health's
reading and application of Section 572-1, which led to the denial of
marriage licenses to plaintiffs, deprived plaintiffs of access to the
myriad rights and benefits that similarly situated persons of oppo-
site gender marriages possess.6 1
Id. (quoting Nelson v. Miwa, 546 P.2d 1005, 1008 n.4 (Haw. 1976)).
By contrast, "[wihere suspect classifications or fundamental rights
are not at issue, this court has traditionally employed the rational basis
test." "Under the rational basis test, we inquire as to whether a statute
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest." "Our inquiry seeks only
to determine whether any reasonable justification can be found for the
legislative enactment."
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 67.
(Section] 572-1 is presumed to be unconstitutional ... unless Lewin, as
an agent of the State of Hawaii, can show that (a) the statute's sex-
based classification is justified by compelling state interests and (b) the
statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the
applicant couples' constitutional rights.
Id.
59. "The department of health shall appoint.., one or more suitable persons as
agents authorized to grant marriage licenses.., in each judicial circuit." HAW. REV.
STAT. § 572-5(a) (Supp. 1992).
60. APPLICATION; LICENSES; LIMITATIONS.
In order to secure a license to marry, the persons applying there for the
license shall appear personally before an agent authorized to grant
marriage licenses and shall file with the agent.., application in writ-
ing... The agent shall indorse on the application, over the agent's sig-
nature, the date of the filing thereof and shall issue a license which
shall bear on its face the date of issuance. Every license shall be of full
force and effect for thirty days commencing from and including the date
of issuance. After the thirty day period, the license shall become void
and no marriage ceremony shall be performed thereon.
It shall be the duty of every person, legally authorized to grant
licenses to marry, to immediately report the issuance of every marriage
license to the agent of the department of health in the district in which
the license is issued, setting forth all facts required to be stated in such
manner and on such form as the department may prescribe.
HAw. REv. STAT. § 572-6 (Supp. 1992).
61. Hawaii statutes grant many rights specifically to married individuals or
couples. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 76-103 (veterans preference to spouse in the
public employment); § 79-7 (vacation allowance on termination of public employ-
ment by death); § 79-13 (funeral leave for government employees); § 83-8 (travel and
transportation expenses of government employees);§ 88-286 (accidental death bene-
fit for surviving spouse for government employee); § 111-12 (assistance to displaced
persons); § 166-6(2) (lease of agricultural parks); § 171-99 (continuation of rights
under existing homestead leases, certificates of occupation, right to purchase leases
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The Baehr court, in its equal rights analysis, distinguished the
four previous decisions regarding gay marriage in other jurisdic-
tions.6 2 The first case dealing with the denial of a marriage license
and cash free hold agreements concerning the management and disposition of public
land); § 172-11 (inheritance of land patent); § 183D-22(1) (lower hunting license fee);
§ 201E-145 (eligibility for housing opportunity allowance program of the Housing
Finance and Development Corporation); § 234-9 (tax relief for natural disaster
losses); §§ 235-1, 235-2.4(a), 235-4, 235-7, 235-7.5, 235-51, 235-52, 235-54, 235-55.6,
235-61, 235-93, 235-97 (income tax deductions, credits, rates, exemptions, and esti-
mates); § 246-29 (homes of totally disabled veterans exempt from property taxes);
§ 247-3(4) (exemption from conveyance tax); § 261-31 (airport relocation assistance
for displaced persons) (definition of family); § 304-4(b) (non-resident tuition deferen-
tial waiver); § 327-3(a)(1) (making, revoking, and objecting to anatomical gifts);
§§ 334-1, 334-60.4, 334-60.5, 334-125 (rights and proceedings from involuntary hos-
pitalization and treatment); §§ 338-1, 338-21 (legal status and the rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations of a child); § 338-14 (waiver of fees for certified copies and
searches of vital statistics); § 338-18 (disclosure of vital statistic records); § 346-15(d)
(permission to make arrangements for the burial or cremation of a spouse); § 346-29
(public assistance from the Department of Human Services); § 346-29.5(c) (exemp-
tion from real property lien of Department of Human Services of allowance to surviv-
ing spouse); § 346-37 (exemption from claims of Department of Human Services for
social services payments, financial assistance, burial payments); § 346-237(3) (notice
of guardian ad litem proceedings); § 351-2 (criminal injuries compensation) (defini-
tion of relative); §§ 363-5(3)(4), 363-7 (burial of servicemen's dependents); §§ 386-34,
386-41, 386-42, 386-43 (payment of worker's compensation benefits); § 388-4 (pay-
ment of wages to relative of deceased employee); § 417E-1 (beneficial owner status of
corporate securities); § 425-4 (proof of business partnership); §§ 431:9-233, 431:10-
206, 431:10-232, 431:10-234, 431:10A-103, 431:10-1OA-116.5, 431:10A-401, 431:10A-
403, 431:10C-103, 431:10C-304, 431:10D-104, 431:10D-114, 431:10D-201, 431:10D-
203, 431:10D-212, 431:10D-308, 431N-1 (insurance licenses, coverage, eligibility,
and benefits); § 432:1-104(2)(a)(i) (organization of mutual benefits society); § 432:1-
604 (in-vitro fertilization procedures coverage); 453-15 (consent to a postmortem ex-
amination); § 486H-9 (right to a gasoline dealer franchise); §§ 510-5, 510-6, 510-9,
510-10, 510-22, 510-23 (control, division, acquisition, and disposition of community
property); § 514A-108 (exemption from regulations of condominium sales to owner-
occupants); § 516-181(b) (sole interest on property); § 524-1 (qualification as facility
for the elderly) (definition of "facility"); §§ 533-1, 533-3, 533-4, 533-5, 533-7, 533-8,
533-16 (notice to probate proceedings, rights by way of dower or curtsey, right to
inherit property); § 551-2 (appointment as guardian of minor); § 554B-6 (right of sur-
vivorship to custodial trust); §§ 560:2-102; 560:2-201, 560:2-207, 560:2-301, 560:2-
401, 560:2-402, 560:2-403, 560:2-404, 560:2-508, 560:2-802, 560:3-101, 560:3-203,
560:3-303, 560:3-403, 560:3-901, 560:3-902, 560:3-906, 560:3-1212, 560:5-210,
560:5-301, 560:5-309, 560:5-311, 560:5-410, 560:5-422, 560:6-107 (rights to notice,
protection, benefits and inheritance under the Uniform Probate Code); § 571-52
(award of child custody in divorce action); § 571-52.1 (support payments in divorce
action); § 572-24 (right to support by spouse); § 572D-1 (right to enter into premari-
tal agreement); § 574-5(a)(3) (right to change name); § 575-3 (right to file action for
nonsupport); §§ 577-14, 577-15, 557-25, 577-26, 577A-3 (status of children); § 580-47
(right to support after divorce); § 580-56 (division of property after dissolution of
marriage); §§ 706-670.5, 706-673 (right to be notified of parole or escape of inmate);
§ 801D-2 (bill of rights for victims and witnesses); § 801D-4 (definition of "surviving
immediate family members"); and succession to Hawaii Homes Commission leases,
Hawaii Homes Commission Act § 209.
62. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61-63 (Haw. 1993).
[Vol. 12:483
BAEHR v. LEWIN
to a same gender couple was Baker v. Nelson.63 In Baker, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court had to decide whether same-sex marriage
was authorized by state statutes and, if not, whether state authori-
zation was constitutionally compelled. 6 4 The court held that the
Minnesota statute did not authorize same-sex marriage and that
such marriages were properly prohibited.65 Thus, the Minnesota
court reached the same decision as the Baehr court: the plain statu-
tory language discriminated with regard to sex.
The Minnesota court also ruled that the Minnesota statute did
not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. 6 6 The Minnesota court said:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exist-
ence and survival of the race. This historic institution is more
deeply founded than the asserted contemporary concept of mar-
riage and societal interests for which petitioners contend. The
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a char-
ter for restructuring it by judicial legislation.6 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court found that, because marriage
was historically a union between a man and a woman, there was a
rational basis to deny two males a marriage license.68 The Minne-
sota court additionally found no invidious discrimination as in Lov-
ing, where the United States Supreme Court found a statute
prohibiting interracial marriage to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.69 Because the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker
did not discuss heightened scrutiny of a statute discriminating
against homosexuals, nor any state constitutional questions, 70 the
Baehr court distinguished this case from the instant one. 7 1
DeSanto v. Barnsley7 2 was also distinguished by the Baehr
court. 73 John DeSanto asserted that he had entered into a common
law marriage with William Barnsley.74 Mr. DeSanto sought equi-
table property distribution and alimony upon dissolution of this re-
lationship.75 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania refused to
63. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed (for want of a substantial
federal question), 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
64. Id. at 186.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 186-87.
67. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
68. Baker v. Nelsen, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
69. Loving v. Virginia, 38 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
70. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185-87.
71. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993).
72. 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
73. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.




expand common law marriage to include a contract between two
persons of the same sex.76
The Pennsylvania court refused to consider appellant's argu-
ment, because he failed to raise it at trial, that denial of the validity
of common law marriage between two persons of the same sex vio-
lated the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment.77 The common
law marriage issues, upon which the DeSanto case was based,
made it readily distinguishable from Baehr.
The Kentucky court in Jones v. Hallahan78 addressed the
question of whether denial of a marriage license to a female couple
abridged their constitutional rights to marry, associate, and exer-
cise religion freely. 79 The court affirmed denial of a marriage li-
cense based on the historical vision of marriage as only between a
man and a woman, as outlined in Baker, and little else.8 0 The Ken-
tucky court found no constitutional issue involved;8 1 the Baehr
76. Id. at 956. The court stated:
Finally, attention to the respective roles of the Legislature and the judi-
ciary compels the conclusion that common law marriage should not be
expanded. Generally speaking, statutory marriage and common law
marriage have been alternative, common law marriage being seen not
as competing with statutory marriage but, rather, as substituting for it
when social conditions made obtaining a marriage license impractical
... Appellant, however, would have us create a form of common law
marriage, not in response to the impracticability of obtaining a mar-
riage license, but in response to the impossibility of obtaining one. For
we have no doubt that under our Marriage Law it is impossible for two
persons of the same sex to obtain a marriage license. If, under the
guise of expanding the common law, we were to create a form of mar-
riage forbidden by statute, we should abuse our judicial power: our deci-
sion would have no support in precedent, and its practical effect would
be to amend the Marriage Law - something only the Legislature can
do.
Id. at 955-56 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 956.
78. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
79. Id. at 589.
Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit marriage between
persons of the same sex nor do they authorize the issuance of a mar-
riage license to such persons.
Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue
licenses for that purpose. For a time the records of marriage were kept
by the church. Some states even now recognize a common-law mar-
riage which has neither the benefit of license nor clergy. In all cases,
however, marriage has always been considered as the union of a man
and a woman and we have been presented with no authority to the
contrary.
It appears to us that appellants are prevented from marrying, not
by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court Clerk of
Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their own inca-






court based its decision on constitutional argument and distin-
guished Jones from the instant case on that basis.82
Plaintiffs in the case of Singer v. Haras3 were two men who
had been refused a marriage license. The Washington Court of Ap-
peals ruled that denial of a marriage license to a male couple did
not violate their equal rights under the Washington Constitution
nor their rights under the Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.8 4 The court also found
that the plaintiffs were "being denied entry into the marriage rela-
tionship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as
one which may be entered into only by two persons who are mem-
bers of the opposite sex."85 Citing Baker and Jones, the Washing-
ton Appellate Court found that homosexuals are not a suspect class
and applied the rational basis test8 6 in affirming denial of the mar-
riage license.87 The rational basis found by the Washington Ap-
peals Court was the historical treatment of marriage as an
institution between male and female.88 Answering the same defini-
tional argument asserted by the defendant in the instant case, the
Baehr court held that such a rationale for prohibiting same-sex
marriage is "circular and unpersuasive."8 9
The Baehr case was remanded to the lower court for determi-
nation of whether the state had "compelling interests" to overcome
the presumption of unconstitutionality of Hawaii Revised Statutes
Section 572-1 based on its suspect sexual classification. The case is
pending a hearing in the lower court.
III. Fundamental Rights Analysis
Wherever, therefore, it has been established that it is shameful
to be involved in homosexual relationships, this is due to evil on
the part of the legislators, to despotism on the part of the rul-
ers, and to cowardice on the part of the governed.90
82. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993).
83. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
84. Id. at 1190-97.
85. Id. at 1192.
86. See supra note 57 for discussion of Hawaii's rational basis test.
87. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196.
88. Id. at 1192.
89. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993).
90. PLATO, Symposium (cited in JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLER-
ANCE, AND HOMOsExuALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING
OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA To THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 51 (1980)).
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A. The Baehr Court's Misinterpretation of Federal
Precedent of the Fundamental Right to Marry
The Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr first examined the U.S.
Supreme Court's fundamental rights analysis in Skinner.9 ' The
Baehr court interpreted Skinner to hold that the right to marry was
inextricably linked to the right to procreate. 92 The United States
Supreme Court in Skinner indicated that it was "dealing with legis-
lation which involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of man."93 "Mar-
riage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race."94 Because procreation is linked to the right to
marriage found fundamental in Skinner, the Baehr court argued
that the union which the Court contemplated is "obviously... be-
tween men and women."95 The Baehr court bolstered this argu-
ment by asserting that the only sanctioned marriage at the time of
Skinner was one which contemplated a union between a man and a
woman.
96
The United States Supreme Court in Skinner did not rule that
procreation is a necessary antecedent to a fundamental marital
right.97 Rather, the Skinner Court stated that marriage is "one of
the basic civil rights of man."98 A "basic" civil right would be one
shared by all. A lesbian's need for companionship and intimacy is
just as strong as a straight man's. If marriage is denied to a lesbian
or gay man, then clearly marriage is not a "basic civil right of
man,"99 but a basic civil right of "straight man." Logically, then,
gay people are marginalized as not having the same basic needs or
rights as other humans; they are not persons in the eyes of the
Baehr court.
91. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55, 56 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
92. Id. at 55 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
93. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
94. Id.
95. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
96. "[T]he foregoing case law demonstrates that the federal construct of the fun-
damental right to marry ... presently contemplates unions between men and wo-
men. (Once again, this is hardly surprising inasmuch as such unions are the only
state-sanctioned marriages currently acknowledged in this country.)" Id. See infra
part Ill-C (discussing reasoning used by the Virginia district court to uphold Vir-
ginia's miscegenation law).
The Baehr court itself disparages arguments that legitimize homoracial mar-
riage because of the Loving history in Virginia. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61-63. The
Baehr court discounts any comparison between homoracial marriage and homosex-
ual marriage as "sophistry." Id. at 63. Yet, they themselves employ similar reason-
ing here.





The Skinner Court qualified the right to marriage by saying:
"[miarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race." 10 0 An argument for the procreative predi-
cate to the fundamental right of marriage would assert: The basic
civil right of marriage relates to that union which is capable of
propagating children and sustaining the survival of the race. Be-
cause homosexual couples are not capable of such procreation, their
unions are not sanctioned as a fundamental civil right. This argu-
ment, however, is based on two false assumptions. First, heterosex-
ual marriages in which procreation is impossible are not excluded
from fundamental rights status.10 1 Second, homosexual couples
are falsely assumed incapable of producing children through meth-
ods such as sperm donation, egg donation, and surrogate mothers.
Homosexual couples can propagate and help "sustain the race."
Further, gay parents can rear children. State law in Hawaii
does not prohibit unmarried homosexuals or homosexual couples
from adoption, birth, or raising children. In fact, if the state has an
interest in providing a nurturing and caring environment for chil-
dren in "sustaining the race," it is illogical for the state to support
laws which discriminate against homosexual couples and their chil-
dren by denying them the many rights and benefits that married
heterosexual couples and their children are eligible to receive.10 2
Conceivably it is this discrimination, not homosexuality, which in-
hibits a nurturing environment for children.10 3
The Baehr court also relied on the rationale of Zablocki,104 in
which the United States Supreme Court offered its most detailed
discussion of the fundamental right to marriage.' 0 5 In Zablocki,
the Court ruld that a Wisconsin statute 06 burdened the funda-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 61, listing various benefits afforded partners in heterosexual
marriage, and their survivors and children.
103. See Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or
Transsexual Parents, 135 Am. J. PSYCHLATRY 692 (1978); Steven Susoeff, Comment,
Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Ra-
tional Custody Standard, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 852 (1985); Marilyn Riley, Note, The
Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge
That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIECo L. REv. 799 (1975).
Since 1967 several jurisdictions have established precedent protecting the cus-
tody and visitation rights of gay and lesbian parents. See, e.g., Nadler v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980)
(sexual preference is per se irrelevant to consideration of his or her parenting skills).
104. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55, 56 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978)).
105. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
106. Wisconsin State Statute Section 245.10(1) provided in pertinent part:
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mental right to marriage.' 0 7 The statute prohibited any resident
with minor children "not in his custody and which he is under obli-
gation to support" from obtaining a marriage license until the resi-
dent demonstrated to a court that "he was in compliance with his
child support."'l0 The Court ruled "that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here
significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe
that 'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in support
of the classification is required."'10 9
The Baehr court interpreted the Zablocki decision to represent
a U.S. Supreme Court assumption that marriage is a fundamental
right because marriage is a predicate to procreation and childbear-
ing.XXO The facts of Zablocki do not support this interpretation."'1
The Zablocki Court spoke of the right to procreate only because
Wisconsin made it a criminal offense for one to have sexual inter-
course with a person not his or her spouse. 112 Hence, in Wisconsin,
one could not exercise the right to procreate except through the in-
stitution of marriage.113 The Zablocki case concerned people with
children who sought a marriage license."l4 The case did not ad-
dress childless marriages, marriages with adopted children, or
same-sex marriages.115 The Baehr court's assertion that the
United States Supreme Court defined marriage as a fundamental
right simply because of the procreative function of marriage is a
misinterpretation of the holding in Zablocki.
No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which
he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment, may
marry in this state or elsewhere, without the order of either the court of
this state which granted such judgment or support order, or the court
having divorce jurisdiction in the county of this state where such minor
issue resides or where the marriage license application is made. No
marriage license shall be issued to any such person except upon court
order.
WIS. STAT. § 245.10(1) (1973); repealed by L. 1977, c. 418 § 745R.
107. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-391.
108. Wis. STAT. § 245.10(1) (1973). See supra note 109, for text of the statute.
109. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
110. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56 ("Implicit in the Zablocki court's link between the right
to marry, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of procreation, childbirth,
abortion and child rearing, on the other, is the assumption that the one is simply the
logical predicate of the others.")
111. 434 U.S. at 377-78.
112. Id. at 386. Wisconsin punishes fornication as a criminal offense: "Whoever
has sexual intercourse with a person not his spouse may be fined not more than $200
or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both." WiS. STAT. § 944.15 (1973).
113. Id.




The Court in Zablocki emphasized that marriage itself is "'the
most important relation in life' "116 and as such is worthy of funda-
mental rights protection. 11 7 The Court also stated "the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals."18 The
Court found that the right to marry is part of the fundamental
"right of privacy.""19 The Baehr court does not examine why the
broad grant of these rights by the U.S. Supreme Court does not ap-
ply to homosexuals in the same manner it does heterosexuals. 120
In conclusory language, the Baehr court simply says it is s0.121
The Baehr court, in its search to delineate the fundamental
right to marriage, failed to consult an important line of constitu-
tional privacy cases which begin with Griswold.122 The holding in
Griswold protects persons from government interference with their
sexual relations.123 The Griswold Court held that it is impermissi-
ble for the state to prohibit married couples from purchasing con-
traception.124 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, rested his
opinion upon the notion that marital privacy is deserving of height-
ened judicial protection from state interference:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -
older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate of the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose
as any involved in our prior decisions.125
Same-sex marriage fosters the same harmony in living and the
same bilateral loyalty as heterosexual unions. The Baehr court
gives no reason why the sex of the couple has anything to do with
the advancement of the purposes of marriage the Court seeks to
protect in Griswold.
The U.S. Supreme Court indicated in the period between Gris-
wold and Roe that other "family" values would receive heightened
116. Id. at 384 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)).
117. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
120. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55-57 (Haw. 1993).
121. Id.
122. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
At the least, the Baehr court failed to distinguish Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), which ruled that a statute which intrudes upon the pri-
vate realm of family life, including life of nontraditional families, must be subjected
to heightened scrutiny to survive constitutional muster. Id. at 498, 499.
123. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
124. Id. at 485-86.
125. Id. at 486.
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protection.126 In Loving v. Virginia,127 the Court found an antimis-
cegenation statute constitutionally infirm for both its invidious race
discrimination and its infringement of the right to marry, which
had "long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."128 The long
"tradition" of homoracial marriage in Virginia was no reason in the
Court's eyes to bar heteroracial individuals from exercising their
freedom to enter into a familial relationship. A long-standing tradi-
tion of prejudice, in the Court's opinion, was no basis for determin-
ing individual liberty interests. 129 The Baehr court failed to
distinguish the impermissibility of grounding a liberty interest in
tradition in Loving, from the permissibility of grounding the denial
of the liberty interest of marriage to homosexuals based on the "tra-
ditions and collective conscience" of our people.130
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,131 the Court invalidated a Massachu-
setts law which criminalized the sale of contraceptive drugs or de-
vices except to married persons with a physician's prescription. 13 2
Under the Massachusetts law, single persons could not obtain con-
traceptives. 3 3 The Eisenstadt court held that such prohibition is
impermissible because:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.13 4
Because the Court states that a basic element of that decision is the
possibility to choose to use contraceptives and not have children, 13 5
it follows that it is a fundamental right to choose to be in an inti-
mate sexual relationship for purposes beyond procreation.13 6 Ei-
126. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
127. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id.
130. See infra discussion in Section III-B (analyzing the prejudicial "traditions
and collective conscience" standard).
131. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
132. Id. at 440.
133. Id. at 442.
134. Id. at 453.
135. Id.
136. This right of choice is also underscored by the Court's decision in Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), stating that the individual's interest in making the mar-
riage decision is sufficiently important to merit special constitutional protection (cit-
ing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
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senstadt further supports the argument that procreation is not an
essential ingredient for protection of sexual associations.
Most importantly, the Eistenstadt decision gives rise to the in-
dividual freedom to have intercourse regardless of procreative in-
tent. If the individual has the freedom to choose to have
intercourse, certainly an aspect of this freedom must include with
whom you will have intercourse. As Justice Marshall stated in
Zablocki, "it would make little sense to recognize a right to privacy
with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to
the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the
family in our society."13 7 A basic element of choosing to enter a
relationship is deciding with whom you are going to make and de-
fine that relationship. The Court does not provide specific restric-
tions about who can make a family; it does not say only African-
American with African-American, man with woman, Catholic with
Catholic. Why, then, except for homophobia, should a man be de-
nied the choice to marry a man? This preclusion of choice is based
on prejudice and the inability to accept the fact that many persons
are homosexual. Such conclusions are the result of the dominant
heterosexual majority prohibiting any deviation from its value
system.138
The doctrine that certain intimate activities, broadly linked
with matters of procreation and family life, are protected as aspects
of personal autonomy was firmly established in Roe v. Wade, where
the Court held a Texas statute prohibiting nontherapeutic abor-
tions unconstitutional.139 The Court's rule in Roe gave the individ-
ual woman the right to choose to do with the fruits of her body what
she herself desired. This is a specific right to choose not to bear chil-
dren. And it is a right to determine for yourself, without regard to
the state government, Moral Majority, or the Catholic Church's
moral parameters of a woman's right to choose. From time imme-
morial, humans have never agreed when life begins.140 The Court
has, therefore, determined that the moral determination is best left
to the individual. Similarly, philosophers and scientists have never
been able to conclusively agree if homosexuality is a product of na-
ture or nurture, but it has always existed. 14 x Like the right to
137. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
138. See supra note 122.
139. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. See discussion of historical ethical debate about abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 129-130 (citing A. Castigliani, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 84 (2d ed. 1947); LUD-
WIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION 10
(1943).
141. See BOSWELL, supra note 90.
1994]
Law and Inequality
choose to have an abortion, this choice of how to order one's per-
sonal life should be afforded the same protection as the personal
moral determination regarding aborition. The resolution of such in-
timate questions of personal morality, the Court reasoned in Roe,
are best determined within the sanctuary of one's conscience and
consciousness. Just as the Court held in Roe that the Constitution
protects the right of a woman to make a moral choice, it must also
recognize the right of a man or a woman to be free from government
intrusion in making a moral decision about who they are and how
to construe their most intimate personality through sexuality. And
as the act of abortion is protected as the expression of a woman's
moral choice, the state must protect same-sex marriage, as this
marriage is the mature expression of a personal, moral decision and
the assertion of fundamental sexual identity.
The only criterion for excluding homosexual associations from
protection in the Baehr court's analysis of federal privacy cases is
precisely the individual's homosexuality.14 2 The court concluded
that because same-sex couples cannot do the same thing as hetero-
sexual couples - procreate - same-sex couples do not have a right
to marry. Yet this is clearly in conflict with the Baehr court's equal
protection analysis which stated it is presumptively unconstitu-
tional for the State of Hawaii to deny persons a marriage license
based on sexual classifications. 143 The court made clear that the
State cannot use one's sex against an individual to deny that per-
son's civil rights. In an absurd result, the court's fundamental
rights conclusion is based precisely on the sex-stereotyping it ruled
impermissible under the Hawaii Equal Protection Clause. The
Baehr court also gives no reason why homosexuals do not enjoy the
same definition of "individual"144 as applied to fundamental rights,
as do heterosexuals. What makes a homosexual less of an individ-
ual than the "individual" contemplated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in its delineation of fundamental rights?
The Baehr court completely ignored the case that lends the
most strength to its conclusion, Bowers v. Hardwick,145 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held there exists no right to homosexual
sodomy.146 By its self-proclaimed duty to look to the federal cases
142. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52-57 (Haw. 1993).
143. Id. at 57-67.
144. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
145. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
146. Id. at 190, 191.
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for guidance in determining liberty interests,Z47 and its selective
use of Skinner 148 and Zablocki,149 it is evident the Baehr court in-
corporated those cases it deemed pertinent law. The Baehr court's
exclusion of the Bowers rule demonstrates its rejection of the Bow-
ers rationale which holds that there is no fundamental right to sod-
omy. In fact, the Hawaii legislature decriminalized private,
consensual adult sodomy in 1972.150 Yet the court employed the
"traditions and collective conscience" test in a manner similar to
Justice White's use of the test in Bowers. 151 Therefore, it is neces-
sary to analyze the use of the "traditions and collective conscience"
test in Bowers to further understand the rationale of the Baehr
court's fundamental rights ruling.
B. The "Traditions and Collective Conscience" Test is
Inherently Prejudicial and an Improper Standard
for Determining Fundamental Rights
The United States Supreme Court has never granted an abso-
lute freedom to sexual association. There is not, for example, a con-
stitutional right to pedophilia, incest, or rape. Traditional factions
within society have argued that homosexuality is a similarly regu-
latable sexual association.I5 2 This analogy is false. Both rape and
pedophilia are criminalized because they violate the rights of others
who are involved without consent. Lack of consent in the context of
rape is an element of the crime.' 5 3 And society's conception of chil-
dren renders impossible consent to sexual activity between an adult
147. "[Blecause there are no Hawaii cases that have delineated the fundamental
right to marry, this court, as we did in [State v.] Mueller, looks to the federal cases
for guidance." Baehr v. Lewin, 855 P.2d at 55 (citations omitted).
148. Id.; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
149. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1986)).
150. HAW. Rav. STAT. § 768-71 repealed by 1972 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 9.
151. Baehr, 852 P.2d 44. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192, 194 (employing the test to
deny a liberty interest).
It is interesting to note that the Baehr court did not cite the precedent of Bowers
for use of the "traditions and collective conscience" test. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 57.
Rather, it cited the dicta in Griswold (where the test was employed to find a liberty
interest) as authority for its use. One can read between the lines that the Baehr
court does not accept the rule of Bowers. Given the ruling in its equal protection
analysis, which effectively allows gays and lesbians to marry, coupled with the
court's refusal to cite Bowers, leads one to speculate if this fundamental rights anal-
ysis isn't a means of a political compromise among the court, where some members
would go along with the equal protection rule on the condition that same-sex mar-
riage was not ruled a fundamental right. There must be some unstated reason why
the court goes out of its way to avoid citing Bowers. We are left to wonder about this
glaring omission.
152. Gunter Schmidt, The Debate on Pedophilia, J. HoMosEXUALITY 1-4 (1990).




and child.154 Although incest does not necessarily involve a lack of
consent, society has recognized a strong interest in avoiding rela-
tionships which are as biologically and psychologically destructive
as incest.155 It is the potential for domination and exploitation in
incestuous relationships which undermines consent to the extent
that the value of the liberty interest is grossly outweighed by its
potential for harm. And unlike pedophilia or incest, there is no pos-
sible remedy for the homosexual if he or she is prohibited from his
or her sexual expression. The polygamist or incestor may pursue a
solitary or nonconsanquinious relationship. The homosexual is in-
hibited from expressing her basic sexual identity, and is forced to be
something she can never be: heterosexual. It is the ability to define
one's identity that is essential to any concept of ordered liberty.156
Therefore, the expression of gay and lesbian identity should be
equally protected.
The issue of sodomy is more difficult. The Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick157 ruled that homosexual intimate associations are not
"deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition."'58 The sole
reason is because homosexual intimacy does not pass the "tradi-
tions and collective conscience" test.' 59 This test was never em-
ployed in previous or subsequent privacy cases to delineate
fundamental rights and, therefore, renders the decision in Bowers
derelict. The problem with the "traditions and collective conscience
test" is twofold: 1) it is inherently prejudicial and 2) its employment
is antithetical to the Framers' notion of determining individual
liberties.
The majority in Bowers arbitrarily drew the line of personal
privacy at the boundary of intimate homosexual relations and, in a
manner unprecedented in a privacy case, narrowly limited previous
154. See Schmidt, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The Court
stated:
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is
designed to secure individual liberty, it must be afford the formation
and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a
substantial amount of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State . . . Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such relation-
ships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emo-
tional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards
the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty.
Id. (emphasis added).
157. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).




privacy rules to their specific facts.160 Justice White, writing for
the Court, obsessed on the homosexual aspect 61 of the case before
him and wholly ignored the fact that the statute at issue also per-
tained to heterosexual sodomy.162 Instead of considering whether
the state of Georgia may constitutionally regulate the private sex-
ual behavior of consenting adults in their bedroom, the Court
presented the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."16 3 So
stated, the conclusion logically preceded its analysis. White's fram-
ing of the issue misconstrued the right at stake. The statute, as is
plainly evidenced upon reading, states nothing about homosexu-
als. 164 It refers to "persons."16 5 The issue, in fact, is similar to that
in Griswold and Zablocki, where the statutes under examination
regulated the intimate associations of individuals in the privacy of
their homes.166 The holdings in these cases focused on the broader
right of persons to be free in their intimate associations from the
reach of state regulation absent a compelling state interest by rea-
son of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 16 7 Justice White concluded that homosex-
ual activity has no connection to any of the previously protected cat-
egories of privacy.' 6 8 However, Justice White gave no reason why
160. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (limiting cases to their specific facts). See, e.g., Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
161. "The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a funda-
mental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
162. Georgia Code Annotated Section 16-6-2 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one and the mouth
or anus of another...
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years . . .
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) (emphasis added).
163. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
164. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
165. Id. see supra note 165 for text of statute.
166. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978).
167. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496 (Justice Goldberg concurring, describing majority
opinion); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 396 (Justice Powell concurring, describing majority
opinion); U.S. CONsT. amend. X; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
168. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. Eisenstadt, Roe, and Zablocki clearly dealt with
issues related to an individual's choices relating to the intimacies of his or her sex-
ual relationships. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Why the expression of an individual's sexual intimacy, as in Bowers, has noth-
ing to do with these decisions is not clear. The only answer can be because it in-
volves homosexuals. Homosexuality clearly erases one's individual integrity for
Justice White. Being a homosexual disqualifies you from all the fundamental rights
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this activity is not related to other protected categories of sexual
relations. 169
Justice White also ignored the Court's previous counsel to not
cut off constitutional protection "at the first convenient, if arbitrary
boundary 170 drawn by its former cases, and ignored the Court's
preference to focus on "the basic reasons why certain rights... have
been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause."171 The Bowers Court, by referring to the Georgia sod-
omy statute as justification for denying privacy protection to
consenual sodomy, disregarded its previous statement that the tra-
dition of liberty under the Due Process Clause has never "been re-
duced to any formula [nor] determined by reference to any code."172
Rather, it has been "a living thing"173 that must grow and change
over time within careful limits sketched by "solid recognition of the
basic values that underlie our society."'17 4 The Bowers Court en-
gaged in no examination of the state's burden of justification for
denying homosexuals their privacy, other than a cursory reference
to the "belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homo-
sexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable."'175
According to the Court in Bowers, constitutional legitimacy
rests in the electoral will of the State of Georgia,176 thus reducing
this privacy question to a "formula or code," a jurisprudence previ-
ously disdained. 177 Such an appeal to democratic legitimation of
constitutional rights would have rendered a different holding in
Loving'?8 and Brown v. Board of Education.179 The role of judicial
that the Court has ruled all other individuals possess. These previous cases did not
protect activities, they protected the rights of individuals to make decisions about
their personal lives absent compelling reasons for government intervention.
169. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
170. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion).
171. Id. at 501.
172. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
175. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 195, 196 (1986).
176. Id.
177. Poe, 367 U.S. 497 at 542.
178. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that an antimiscegenation law
of the state of Virginia is unconstitutional even if it had been the tradition of the
state to bar mixed-race marriages).
179. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). One of the most memorable events of American cultural
history in the late 1950's and early 1960's is the riots accompanying desegregation.
See generally WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 799-808 (1978). In
states such as Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi, the enforcement of Brown v.
Board of Education evidenced execution of constitutional law which was directly an-
tithetical to the democratic will of a majority. Id. An example of this was exhibited
by the public resistance which occurred in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957. Id. School
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interpretation in the United States is precisely to insure the exist-
ence of an arbiter of values which is independent from the tyranny
of a majority.18 0 At a time when judicial restraint is most needed to
protect an historically oppressed minority from the irrational ha-
tred of the majority, the Bowers Court caved in to that tyrannical
will.
The words of Thomas Jefferson directly refute the rationale of
Justice White in his employment of the "traditions and collective
conscience" test:
I believe all Americans are born with certain inalienable rights.
As a child of God, I believe my rights are not derived from the
Constitution. My rights are not derived from any government.
My rights are not derived from any majority. My rights are be-
cause I exist.1 8 1
The assumption of Jefferson is that certain inalienable rights derive
from the fact of being human from the integrity of the individual
qua individual. According to Jefferson's intellectual mentor, John
Locke, the inalienable rights of the individual are not derived from
the will of the majority or the history of a people, but from human
nature.' 8 2 The essence of Lockean natural rights is well stated by
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence: "all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalien-
able rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness."' 8 3 Further, these claims are "self-evident;"' 8 4 they are
not to be divined from a statute, a Constitution or a majority's will.
Locke claimed that by nature we all equally share basic rights:
authorities developed a plan for desegregation, but the legislature engaged in a pro-
gram to perpetuate racial segregation in violation of Brown v. Board of Education II
and the order of U.S. District Judge Ronald Davies. Id. Governor Orval Faubus
sent state troops to prevent blacks from entering the previously white high school.
Id. The governor was enjoined from further interference with the execution of
Brown Ii. Id. To enforce the constitutional ruling, federal troops were sent to allow
the blacks to attend the schools. Id. The will of the legislature, or the majority ap-
proval of segregation was not the legitimizing principle of Brown. A social evil such
as racism in Mississippi in the 1950's would never have been rooted out if we relied
on majoritarian legitimation of fundamental liberties. Clearly racism has not been
rooted out of Mississippi, or the rest of America, but we have come farther than we
were in 1954 thanks to non-majoritarian dependent constitutional principles.
180. See infra part III-B (discussing the writings of James Madison).
181. Thomas Jefferson, cited by SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JuDIARy, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BoaK To BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 7, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1987) (citing Comm. Print Draft, Vol. 1, at 68).
182. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 92-95 (1960).
183. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). The use of the word
"men" in this text unfortunately was sexist and racist as it flowed from the pen of
Jefferson. "Men" referred only to white propertied men, not to women or black
slaves. But the substance of these words, even if couched in the form of sexism and
racism, have empowered us as a society to make substantial gains in challenging
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[It] is very evident, [that] Man has a Natural Freedom... since
all that share in the same common Nature, Faculties and Pow-
ers, are in Nature equal, and ought to partake in the same com-
mon Rights and Privileges, till the manifest appointment of
God ... can be produced to shew [sic] any particular Person's
Supremacy, or a Mans [sic] own consent subjects him to a
Superior. 185
An appeal to majoritarian normative assertions as the legitimation
of constitutionally implicit unenumerated liberties is dubious when
these majoritarian norms are employed to deny individuals rights
which all humans share. Recall that the Court has repeatedly as-
serted that "marriage is a fundamental right of man" 18 6 This
clearly must include all humans. White's analysis in Bowers ap-
pears to suggest that there are characteristics, such as homosexual-
ity, which can cancel basic, self-evident human rights. But from
where does the Court divine the standard that homosexuality ren-
ders one non-human?
James Madison contemplated that in a democratic republic
there is always the danger of the majority asserting a tyrannical
will over a minority, in disregard of principles of justice. 18 7 These
principles of justice are ignored by the Court; in their place is sub-
stituted the homophobic prejudice of the electorate of Georgia and
the majority of the Court. The Constitution's purpose is to guard
against this mendaciousness.18 8
Madison worried about factions further, and stated:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
both sexism and racism. It is the power of the spirit of equality in this passage which
I wish to stress.
184. Id.
185. LocKE, supra note 182, at 208.
186. E.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1965); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978). Is the word "man" here, again, a sexist term? Does this rule apply to only
men, or did the nine male Justices simply forget that half of those who marry are
women? Is man here suppose to be synonomous with "human?" And if the word
man does mean "human" does it apply to homosexual men and women?
187. In his apologetics for the Constitution, Madison stated:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtu-
ous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith and of public
and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules ofjustice and
the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority.




interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community.I 8 9
As the architect of the Bill of Rights concluded, different people will
always have divergent opinions, values, interests, and lifestyles. 190
When the minority's interest is not harmful to the majority, the mi-
nority's interest is to be protected from tyrannical passions of a ma-
jority.19 1 Justice White articulated no reason why intimate
homosexual associations have an adverse affect on the rights of
heterosexuals.19 2 Offending the sensibilities of some, even a major-
ity, has never been a justification for denying citizen's fundamental
human rights. 193 The gay men in Bowers were not asking for a spe-
cial right. Rather, they sought not to be incarcerated194 for the inti-
mate expression of the most personal aspects of their identity. 195
Madison stated that the first priority of government is to protect
the right of persons to exercise the different manifestations of
human nature:
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at
liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long
as the connection subsists between his reason and self-love, his
opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on
each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter
will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men,
from which the rights of property originate, is not less and insu-
perable obstacle to uniformity of interests. The protection of
these faculties is the first object of government. 196
The Court's decision does violence to Madison's rationale and of-
fends the human integrity of the gay plaintiffs in Bowers.
Succumbing to the electoral majority's will - the collective
conscience - Justice White redacts history (the tradition portion of
the test) and calls upon a history tainted with prejudice against
homosexuals:197
189. Id. at 78.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. The converse, however, is true: it is the prejudice of a homophobic majority
which denies homosexuals basic human dignity.
193. See, e.g. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (1993) (where the Supreme Court of
Colorado ruled that a voter-initiated Amendment to the Colorado Constitution which
prohibited the legislature from granting minority or protected status to homosexu-
als, infringed the plaintiffs' fundamental right to participate on equal basis in the
political process); See also supra note 180.
194. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(b) (1984) (providing a prison term of from one to
twenty years for acts of sodomy).
195. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
196. TRE FEDERALIST, supra note 187, at 78 (emphasis added).
197. Justice White's appeal to history does not include a review of the places and
times where homosexuality has been fostered and legitimate. The priest in this case
employs only the history he wants to consider and perpetuates his assumptions of
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Proscriptions against that conduct [consensual sodomy] have
ancient roots... Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law
and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States
when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the
Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50
States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District
of Columbia continue, to provide criminal penalties for sodomy
performed in private and between consenting adults . . .
Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such
conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at best,
facetious.19 8
This appeal to history is at best disingenuous. The Court's previous
rulings in the area of privacy disavow such an anachronistic and
ahistorical interpretation of history. 199 In Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Justice White in his dis-
sent rejected this very use of history as a decisive model of constitu-
tional interpretation. 200  He recognized that constitutional
interpretation often revises the Founders' explicit understanding
for the more abstract principles that the Constitution serves. 2 0 '
The issue of constitutional interpretation is not how a previous gen-
eration failed to recognize a fundamental right, but how today, in
light of cultural circumstances, fundamental rights should be con-
strued with current constitutional principles.202 Further, as John
Boswell demonstrates through exposition of primary ancient texts
the world. This appeal to history is utterly subjective and is unworthy of employ-
ment as constitutional jurisprudence. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
198. Id. at 192-94. Chief Justice Burger asserts the same rationalization in his
concurring opinion:
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been sub-
ject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.
Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime
under Roman law... During the English Reformation when powers of
the ecclesiastical courts were transferred to the King's Courts, the first
English statute criminalizing sodomy was passed . . . Blackstone de-
scribed "the infamous crime against nature" as an offense of "deeper
malignity" than rape, a heinous act "the very mention of which is a dis-
grace to human nature," and a "crime not fit to be named."
Id. at 196-97.
199. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 789 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). "As its prior cases clearly show, how-
ever, this Court does not subscribe to the simplistic view that constitutional inter-
pretation can possibly be limited to the 'plain meaning' of the Constitution's text, or
to the subjective intention of the Framers." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. "The Constitution... is a document announcing fundamental principles
in value-laden terms that leave ample scope for the exercise of normative judgment
by those charged with interpreting and applying it."
202. See infra part III-C.
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in Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality, through the
late middle ages homosexuality was well tolerated and encouraged,
and gay marriages were sanctioned by the Catholic Church.203
This again shows that it depends on whose history you choose to
exposit when making sweeping conclusions. Justice White is recal-
citrant to searching for and expositing positive gay history; he is a
myopic editor.
David Richards notes that an important document in the con-
struction of the final Constitution describes the Framers' drafting
style:
In the [draft] of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve
attention:
1. To insert essential principles only; lest the operations of gov-
ernment should be clogged by rendering those provisions per-
manent and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to
times and events; and
2. To use simple and precise language, and general proposi-
tions, according to the example of the (several) constitutions of
the several states. (For the construction of a constitution neces-
sarily differs from that of law.)2 0 4
Madison and his colleagues regarded Constitutional interpretation
as an historically continuous enterprise among free, rational, equal
persons.2 0 5 An historically continuous interpretation of the Consti-
tution requires sensitivity to context - to the factors that bear
upon the forms public justification must take in different circum-
stances and periods. 2 06 The Founders conceived the Constitution
as a structure of governance that would endure over many genera-
tions, and they drafted the Constitution in anticipation of an inter-
pretive practice that would be historically sensitive to an enduring
community of principles. 20 7 Chief Justice Marshall articulated this
sentiment in McCulloch v. Maryland:208 "[A] constitution [is] in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted
to various crises of human affairs."209 Marshall argued that the
Framers intended to provide a general constitution which would be
sensitive to the peculiar circumstances of particular generations.2 10
203. See BOSWELL, supra note 90.
204. David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 821 (1986) (citing document apparently prepared for use by
Committee of Detail, reprinted in NOTES OF JAMES MADISON 4, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 37-38 (M. Farrand rev. ed., 1966) (emphasis added)).
205. Id. at 821.
206. Id. at 822-24.
207. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARv. L. REV. 885, 902-13 (1985).
208. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).




The "traditions and collective conscience" test begs the ques-
tion. If homosexual marriage was an aspect of our cultural tradi-
tion, then it would be an established institution not in need of
adjudication. It is implicitly impossible for liberty and fundamental
rights to evolve if they are not found in the tradition of our people.
Gay people should be afforded the same liberation of their civil
rights as other minorities within our culture. The evolution of their
civil rights should not be dependent upon a test by which the con-
clusion precedes its analysis.
Traditional moral condemnation of homosexuality has dimin-
ished the intimate, imaginative, emotional, and intellectual free-
dom through which homosexuals construct a personal and ethical
way of life. Violence against moral and personal independence is
not at the outpost of the constitutional notion of privacy as an
unenumerated right: it is at its very soul. It is paradoxical to miti-
gate the scope of unenumerated rights, like the right to intimate
association, exactly where the right would protect the moral inde-
pendence of a traditionally oppressed minority.2 1 1 Appeals to the
"traditions and collective conscience" legitimizes the hate and dis-
enfranchisement of homosexuals. 2 12 As Madison thought, judicial
power is most legitimate when it holds democratic majorities to ar-
guments of principles and establishes in the minds of the people
truths and principles which they might never have thought other-
wise.2 13 One such principle is that equal rights must be fairly ex-
tended to the most despised minorities.2 14 That view of the written
constitution is betrayed when the judiciary fails to respect the right
of homosexuals to the moral independence of a private life that is
the right of heterosexuals. The protection of homosexual intimate
associations is one of the most necessary elaborations of the consti-
tutional right to privacy, because homosexuals are in greatest need
of protection concerning those matters most fundamentally affect-
ing their identity and personhood.
Employment of the "traditions and collective conscience" test
is dubious as legitimate constitutional jurisprudence. As such, use
of this test to delineate fundamental rights, as in Baehr,2 15 should
be disdained and rejected as a means for settling an important is-
sue such as the right to same-sex marriage.
211. Id. at 415-37.
212. The conclusion of this test would perpetuate homophobia.
213. See supra notes 187 and 196 and accompanying text.
214. This logically follows the philosophical assumptions of Jefferson, Locke, and
Madison as expostulated in notes 185, 187 and accompanying text.
215. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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C. Modern Culture Evidences a Collective Conscience That
Gay and Lesbian Rights are a Liberty Interest
Worthy of Fundamental Rights Protection.
Even if we were to accept, arguendo, the "traditions and collec-
tive conscience" test as a means to determine liberty interests,
there is much evidence which indicates that gay and lesbian rights
are an aspect of society's collective conscience and worthy of funda-
mental rights protection. It has not been until recently that homo-
sexuals have asserted themselves as equals in our society.216 John
D'Emilio traces how World War II uprooted tens of millions of men
and women from traditional family settings, depositing them in a
variety of sex-segregated, non-familial environments. 217 For a gen-
eration of Americans, World War II provided a mechanism for
many persons to experience same-sex love, affection, and sexuality,
and participate in a larger social group of gay men and women.218
For many, the sexual milieu of the war years provided an environ-
ment of sexual experiences that had been unimaginable in small
town and traditional family environments. 219 While the war years
allowed gay men and women to discover themselves and each other,
postwar repression heightened consciousness of belonging to a
group.220 Cold War politics strove to reconstruct traditional sexual
roles by pressuring women to exit the labor force. 221 Homosexuals
found themselves under virulent attack.222 They were removed
from the military, subject to congressional investigation into gov-
ernment employment of "perverts", and disbarred from federal
jobs.223 They were subject to widespread FBI surveillance, state
psychopath laws, increased harassment from urban police forces,
and the inflammatory headlines of city presses warning residents of
the dangers of "sex deviants."224 The oppression of McCarthyism
helped create the minority it sought to eradicate.225
The combined influence of the war, publication in 1948 of the
Kinsey survey on human sexual behavior, the persecutions of Mc-
Carthyism, and a growing civil rights movement animated gays and
216. See infra notes 230-237 and accompanying text.
217. John D'Emilio, Gay Politics, Gay Community, in HIsToRY OF HOMOSEXUALrrY
IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 88-112 (Wayne R. Dynes & Stephen Donaldson eds., 1992).
218. Id. at 88.
219. Id.
220. Id.







lesbians to coalesce and build a political movement. 226 Black mili-
tants in the late 1950s and early 1960s provided a model for an
oppressed minority to reject assimilation and transform their
stigma into a source of pride and power.
Stonewall is the most significant instance in American culture
of homosexual assertion of self-respect.227 Social consciousness
was born amongst many homosexuals with this first act of self-re-
spect. Stonewall represents the birth of an outwardly expressive
cultural tradition.228 There is a large body of critical literature to-
day which speaks to the injustices underlying traditional concep-
tions of homosexuality as a disease or a vice.2 29 It is finally
recognized in a growing area of broader culture that homosexuals
live with as much personal and ethical value as heterosexuals.230
During the past 25 years, more than half of the states have
decriminalized private homosexual acts between consenting
adults. 231 Some traditional condemnations of homosexuality inter-
pret sexual preference in the same way race was interpreted by
Nineteenth Century theories of racial difference. 232 Such theories
stereotypically associate homosexuality with images of incompe-
226. Id. at 90.
227. In late June of 1969, New York police raided the Stonewall bar in Greenwich
Village arresting persons for engaging in criminal behavior. That criminal behavior
was being and associating with homosexuals. Gay men and women took to the
streets that weekend and following week in an angry, violent response to police bru-
tality and harassment. The riot is heralded as the beginning of the gay liberation
movement in the United States.
228. If any culture is a macrocosm of a myriad of smaller cultures, the United
States would be so defined. Which, again, underscores the question: Whose culture
and whose tradition is given primacy in determining fundamental rights?
229. David A. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:
A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
957 (1979); see e.g. ALAN P. BELL, et al., SEXUAL PREFERENCE, ITS DEVELOPMENT IN
MEN AND WOMEN (1981); ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN WEINBERG, HoMOSEXUALITIES: A
STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978); see also DERRICK SHERWIN BAi-
LEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION (1955); PHILIP BLU-
MENSTEIN & PEPPER ScHwARTz, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX (1983);
WAINWRIGHT CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES: A CROSS-CULTURAL
AND CROSS-SPECIES INVESTIGATION (1967); MARTIN HOFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD: MALE
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CREATION OF EVIL (1968); WILLIAM H. MASTERS &
VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE (1979); JOHN J. McNEILL,
THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL (1976).
230. Richards, supra note 229.
231. There are 26 states which have decriminalized private, consensual adult ho-
mosexual acts, either by legislative (Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) or judicial means (New York, Penn-
sylvania, and Massachusetts).
232. Richards, supra note 229.
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tence, immaturity, licentiousness, and animalistic immorality.23 3
These theories, once accepted, are laughable today. As David Rich-
ards notes, these stereotypes are themselves the cultural artifacts
of a long history of uncritical prejudice about proper sexuality and a
morality that required sex to be procreational and to follow mascu-
line domination and feminine submission. 234
It has not been since Stonewall that our "collective conscience"
has listened to and considered that homosexuals live lives of integ-
rity similar to heterosexuals. As this consciousness grows, and as
more homosexuals "come out of the closet" it is appropriate to admit
that homosexuality is a vibrant aspect of our "collective conscience"
and homosexuals are worthy of the same fundamental rights as
heterosexuals.
D. The Baehr Court Misconstrues Article I, Section 6 of
the Hawaii Constitution as Evidenced in the
Legislative History of Article I, Section 6.
The Framers of the Hawaii Constitution, in their debate about
the right to privacy at the Constitutional Convention in 1978, ex-
plicitly stated that individuals have the right to control certain
highly intimate and personal affairs.235 If the Baehr Court was
concerned with the most pertinent history regarding homosexuality
and privacy, it would have consulted the legislative history of Arti-
cle 1, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution.23 6 The discussion re-
garding sexual orientation at the Constitutional Convention of 1978
did not question whether homosexuality was protected under the
Hawaii Constitution but, rather, under which provision of the Bill
of Rights of the Hawaii Constitution sexual orientation would be
covered.237
233. Id. at 978-83.
234. See Richards, supra note 229.
235. COMMITTEE ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS, SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS, STAND COMM.
REP. No. 69, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
HAWAII OF 1978 at 671, 675 (1978) [hereinafter COMMrrrEE ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
236. Id. at 674-75.
237. The Committee explained that Article 1, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution
"gives each and every individual the right to control certain highly personal and
intimate affairs of his own life." STAND. Comm. REP. No. 69, reprinted in 1 PROCEED-
INGS OF THE CONSTrruTIoNAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF HAWAII 674 (1978). The
right to personal autonomy, to dictate one's lifestyle, to be oneself are included in the
concept of liberty. Id. The Committee quoted Justice Abe's concurring opinion in
State v. Kanter, 493 P.2d 306 (Haw. 1972), that each person has the "fundamental
right of liberty to make a fool of himself as long as his act does not endanger others."
Id.
The Committee of the Whole of the Convention adopted a report on Committee
Proposal 15, which stated that Section 6, the Right to Privacy, was "intended to in-
sure that privacy is treated as a fundamental right for purposes of constitutional
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The Committee on Bill of Rights stated:
The question of whether provisions regarding discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation should be included in the Con-
stitution concerned your Committee. Certain members of your
Committee argued that the inclusion of such a provision would
extend nondiscrimination to another minority group.
Your Committee believes that the inclusion of such a pro-
vision would be duplicative of the equal protection and due pro-
cess protections already existing in the Constitution.
Accordingly, your Committee believes that the inclusion of a
provision related to discrimination based on sexual orientation
would be superfluous. 23 8
"Superfluous" is defined in Webster's Dictionary as "exceeding what
is sufficient or necessary; extra; marked by wastefulness." 23 9 For a
provision on sexual orientation to have been excluded from the
right to privacy section for the sole reason that its inclusion would
have been superfluous, sexual orientation must therefore be consid-
ered a fundamental right.2 40
In the most pertinent privacy case decided by the Hawaii court
since the 1978 Amendment, the court in State v. Kam 24 1 exten-
sively reviewed the legislative history of Article 1, Section 6 of the
Hawaii Constitution. The Court stated that the Amendment "gives
each and every individual the right to control certain highly per-
sonal and intimate affairs of his own life. The right to personal au-
analysis." 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII at 1024.
The Committee wrote: "this privacy concept encompasses the notion that in certain
highly personal and intimate matters, the individual should be afforded freedom of
choice absent a compelling state interest." Id. The Committee explained that
This privacy right is similar to the privacy right in cases such as Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is a right that, though
unstated in the federal Constitution, emanates from the penumbra of
several guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Because of this, there has been
some confusion as to the source of the right and the importance of it. As
such, it is treated as a fundamental right subject to interference only
when a compelling state interest is demonstrated.
Id.
Delegate Hale, speaking in opposition to an amendment to remove the privacy
section in Stand Comm. Rep. No. 69 stated:
I recall, for instance, that somebody in an election campaign on the
mainland is being accused of being a homosexual. This is a very pri-
vate, personal thing; it has nothing to do with whether the person is
qualified to be a governor. This is the kind of information that I con-
sider would be protected by a right to privacy.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII 640 (1978).
238. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII 675 (1978).
239. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1160 (G & C Merriam Co. 1980).
240. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII at 675.
241. 748 P.2d 372 (Haw. 1988) (ruling that Hawaii Revised Statute Section 712-
1214(1)(a), which bans the commercial sale of pornography, impermissibly abridges
Article 1, Section 6 of the Hawaii constitution).
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tonomy, to dictate his lifestyle, to be oneself are included in this
concept of privacy."2 4 2 It is inconsistent that the court explicitly
underscored that a man has the right to be "oneself" and "dictate
his lifestyle," yet does not have the right to marry the man he loves.
Gays and lesbian do not have the same rights to order their inti-
mate lives. This is evidenced by the myriad property and personal
rights granted to married persons243 in support of their unions.
Same-sex couples suffer a disparate effect in ordering their lives to-
gether. Clearly, the logical conclusion of the court's rule is that
gays and lesbians are not "each and every individual" or for that
matter, any individual. What, then, are they?
The Baehr court states that it is "free to give broader privacy
protection [under Article I, Section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution]
than that given by the federal constitution."244 Yet, the court re-
fused to state what is most plain from the federal cases: that all
individuals have the right to marry. The Baehr court stated this
rule would have "talismanic effect;" 2 45 it would be a "magical or mi-
raculous" result for it to declare that rules which have been held to
apply to all individuals, actually do. In fact, the true "talismanic
effect" of which the court is afraid, is that the plainest reading of
privacy doctrine - which applies fundamental marital rights to all
individuals - smashes the heterosexual familial paradigm and ad-
mits that gay people have equally legitimate family lives. This, of
course, is an admission the patriarchal court was unwilling to
grant. And as Richard Mohr observes, this type of legal interpreta-
tion is "the chief way that society as a whole tells gays they are
scum."
2 4 6
E. The Baehr Court's Fundamental Rights Rationale is
Logically Inconsistent with Its Equal Protection
Rationale.
The Baehr court's interpretation of Loving v. Virginia's24 7
equal protection analysis renders its fundamental rights analysis
inconsistent. 2 48 In a ruling that the United States Supreme Court
242. Id. at 492.
243. See supra note 61.
244. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (quoting State v. Kam, 748 P.2d
at 377).
245. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57; WEBSTER'S defines "talismanic" as "something produc-
ing apparently magical or miraculous results . . . to initiate into the mysteries."
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 243 at 1180.
246. Richard Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at Sodom: Gays and Privacy, 18 COLuM.
Hum. RTs. L. REV. 43, 53 (1987).
247. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
248. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 at 63 (1993).
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flatly overturned, the Virginia court declared that interracial mar-
riage could not exist because the Deity had deemed such marriage
intrinsically unnatural.24 9 Therefore, it has never been the "cus-
tom" of the state to recognize mixed marriages; marriage always
having been construed to presuppose a different configuration.
25 0
The Baehr court stated that "as Loving amply demonstrates, consti-
tutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs change with
an evolving social order."25 1 Further, the Baehr court stated in ref-
erence to the Virginia court's conclusions: "we reject this exercise in
tortured and conclusory sophistry."25 2 Reject it rhetorically they
might, but this "tortured and conclusory sophistry" is the same rea-
soning employed in the Baehr fundamental rights analysis.
25 3
The Baehr court, in reasoning similar to the Virginia district
court, held that homosexual unions should be excluded as a funda-
mental right because heterosexual marriage was the only marriage
considered legitimate at the time the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Skinner 25 4 and Zablocki.25 5 If Virginia's argument that tradition
legitimates a law which prohibits interracial marriages is "tortured
and conclusory sophistry,"256 then clearly, the Baehr court's argu-
ment that, traditionally, marriage of heterosexual couples is the
only type of marriage contemplated by its very definition is also
"tortured and conclusory sophistry."25 7 This obvious inconsistency
suggests that it is not only the courts of Virginia which practice
intellectual fraud to protect the mainstream interests and values of
their state.
The Baehr court, with continued illogic, went on to assert that
its determination of fundamental rights is grounded in "the tradi-
tions and collective conscience of our people."25 8 As noted above,
the court concluded that "we do not believe that a right to same-sex
marriage is so rooted in the traditions of our people."259 How can
the same court which stated that "constitutional law may mandate,
like it or not, that customs change with an evolving social order"2 60
249. Id. at 62 (citing 388 U.S. at 3.)
250. Id.
251. Id. at 63.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 57 ("we do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is rooted in the
traditions and collective conscience of our people").
254. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
255. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
256. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). See also, Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
257. Baehr, 852 P.2d 44.
258. Id. at 57.
259. Id. at 57.
260. Id. at 63.
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declare that the basis for determining fundamental rights rests in
the "customs and traditions of our people?"261 It is impossible for
the Baehr court to reconcile its condemnation of the use of tradition
and custom with its own employment of this rationale in its funda-
mental rights analysis. 26 2 The core issue brought by the plaintiffs
before the Hawaii court is whether the state may perpetuate its tra-
dition of homophobia.263 The court skirted this central issue by ar-
guing, circularly, that a fundamental right denied to a class of
people throughout history is not a fundamental right if society has
traditionally denied that right to those people. 264 Such reasoning
will lead to a social order in Hawaii that will never evolve, at least
not for minorities. The Baehr court's reasoning is logically face-
tious and a spurious disposition of the fundamental rights issue.
IV. Denial of Fundamental Rights Status to Homosexual
Unions Perpetuates the Violence Leveled Against
Gays and Lesbians
Even though culture is more tolerant of homosexuals today
than it was before Stonewall in 1969,265 much of the story which
encompasses homosexuality in America is filled with homophobic
aggression and ideology.2 66 The central theme of this story is fear,
hatred, stigmatization, and violence.267 Gay men and lesbians
have been defined as "faggots" (after the pieces of kindling used to
burn their bodies), "monsters," "fairies," "bull dykes," "perverts,"
"freaks," and "queers."268 Their intimacies have been termed
"abominations," "crimes against nature," and "sins not to be named
among Christians."269 In the United States, lesbians and gay men
have been "condemned to death by choking, burning and drowning;
... executed, [castrated], jailed, pilloried, fined, court-martialed,
261. Id.
262. Long before the Hawaii court disparaged the use of tradition and custom as a
rationale for construing the Constitution, Justice Holmes wrote in The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897):
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry the IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Id.
263. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55.
264. Id.
265. See supra note 230.
266. JONATHAN KATz, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE
U.S.A.: A DocuMENTARY 11, 22-23, 44, 127-28 (1976).
267. Id.
268. Id. This list is by no means exhaustive.
269. Id. Recall the similar language in the Bowers opinion of Justice White and
Chief Justice Burger, supra III-B.
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prostituted, fired, framed, blackmailed, disinherited, [lobotomized,
shock-treated, psychoanalyzed and] declared insane, driven to in-
sanity, to suicide, murder, self-hate, witch-hunted, entrapped, ster-
eotyped, mocked, insulted, isolated .... castigated, . . . despised
[and degraded]."270
The legal hostility to homosexuality, as demonstrated in the
Baehr fundamental rights analysis, encourages those elements in
society which inflict physical violence on gays and lesbians. The
fundamental rights ruling in Baehr encourages others to prevent
and punish deviations from heterosexual acts and identities be-
cause homosexuality is viewed through the law as not worthy of the
same civil protections as heterosexual identity.
The denial of the fundamental right to marriage to homosexu-
als has a profound disparate effect on gays and lesbians. Thurgood
Marshall argued before the Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion271 that the Court must consider the effect of segregation on
public education in their consideration of "separate but equal." The
Court concluded that "separate but equal" had a clear disparate ef-
fect on African-Americans. 272 The structural violence affecting Af-
rican-Americans was enough to motivate the Court to dispel the
"separate but equal" of Plessy v. Ferguson.273 A similar violent dis-
parate impact affects lesbians and gay men.
A report issued by Community United Against Violence made
a recent report about homophobic violence in America:
One man's body was discovered with his face literally beaten
off. Another had his jaw smashed into eight pieces by a gang of
youths taunting "you'll never suck another cock, faggot!" An-
other had most of his lower intestine removed after suffering
severe stab wounds in the abdomen. Another was stabbed 27
times in the face and upper chest with a screwdriver, which
leaves a very jagged scar. Another had both lungs punctured
by stab wounds, and yet another had his aorta severed.274
Such stories are not random, sporadic acts of violence, but are typi-
cal of a continuous pattern of hate.275 A survey of anti-gay violence
and harassment in eight major cities evidences this: 86.2% of homo-
sexuals surveyed stated that they had been attacked verbally;
44.2% reported they had been threatened with violence; 27.3% had
objects thrown at them; 19.2% had been punched, hit, kicked, or
270. Id.
271. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
272. Id. at 485.
273. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
274. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431,
1463 (1992).
275. Id. at 1463-64.
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beaten; 9.3% had been assaulted with a deadly weapon; 18.5% had
been the victims of property vandalism or arson; 30.9% reported
sexual harassment, many by members of their own family or by the
police. 276 A study commissioned by the National Institute of Jus-
tice (the research arm of the U.S. Department of Justice) found that
homosexuals "are probably the most frequent victims [of hate vio-
lence todayl." 2 77 Most gay persons have their own stories.
At a recent hearing before the San Francisco Board of Su-
pervisors, a physician at a city hospital testified to the peculiar
brutality leveled against gays and lesbians. He testified the in-
tent of the violence was "to kill and maim."2 78
Weapons include knives, guns, brass knuckles, tire irons,
baseball bats, broken bottles, metal chains, and metal pipes.
Injuries include severe lacerations requiring extensive plastic
surgery; head injuries, at times requiring surgery; puncture
wounds of the chest requiring insertion of chest tubes; removal
of the spleen for traumatic rupture; multiple fractures of the
extremities, jaws, ribs, and facial bones; severe eye injuries, in
two cases resulting in permanent loss of vision; as well as se-
vere psychological trauma the level of which would be to diffi-
cult to measure.2 79
And one study of homophobic murders concluded that in
most circumstances, the victims were not just killed, but were
"more apt to be stabbed a dozen or more times, mutilated, and
strangled . . . [and] [iun a number of instances . . . stabbed or
mutilated even after being fatally shot."280
Why? Simply because they are gay or lesbian.
At a hearing on homophobic violence in October 1986, the dis-
trict attorney of New York County told the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, that "at times [lesbian and gay men] have been, and in
many areas of the country continue to be, taunted, harassed, and
even physically assaulted by the very people whose job it is to pro-
tect them."2 S1 A recent survey of homophobic violence cites a report
of police practices in which a police officer describes standard treat-
ment of homosexuals:
Now in my own case when I catch a guy like that I just pick him
up and take him into the woods and beat him until he can't
crawl. I have had seventeen cases like that in the last couple of
years. I tell the guy if I catch him doing that again I will take
him out to the woods and shoot him. I tell him that I carry a
276. Id. at n.125.
277. Id. at 1464 (citing PETER FINN AND TAYLOR McNEIL, THE RESPONSE OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO BIAS CIRIE: AN EXPLORATORY REVIEW 2 (1987)).
278. Id. at 1466.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1465.
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second gun on me just in case I find guys like him and that I
will plant it in his hand and say that he tried to kill me and
that no jury will convict me.28 2
The brutality of violence against lesbian and gay men persua-
sively evidences the vicious hatred harbored and leveled against
persons whom the law stigmatizes as unworthy of the same funda-
mental rights as heterosexuals. The recognition of marriage as a
fundamental right for homosexuals is essential because marriage is
the recognition of the mature expression of sexual identity. Sexual
identity is the expression of integrated, mature personal identity.
To deny homosexuals the recognition of their fundamental right of
marriage, is to deny the ultimate expression of their sexual iden-
tity, and this is to deny a basic definition of personal integrity. De-
nial of fundamental rights status to homosexuals compels the
homosexual to constantly deny and erase a basic element of her per-
sonality. This legally compelled erasure of sexual identity legiti-
mates the acts of others, who through violence and brutality
attempt to erase those who are homosexual. This effect is uncon-
scionable for our Constitution and our society.
Drawing on the work of John Rawls, David Richards defends a
broad principle of "love as a civil liberty:"
Freedom to love means that a mature individual must have au-
tonomy to decide how or whether to love one another. Restric-
tions on the form of love imposed in the name of the distorting
rigidities of convention that bear no relation to individual emo-
tional capacities and needs would be condemned. Individual
autonomy, in matters of love, would ensure the development of
people who would call their emotional nature their own, secure
in the development of attachments that bear the mark of spon-
taneous human feeling and that touch one's original
impulses.28 3
This notion offers a clearer definition of how to construe the Ameri-
can collective conscience about love and personal intimate rela-
tions. It also provides a more realistic notion by which to determine
marital rights and liberties. Such an ethic would clearly contem-
plate gay and lesbian marriages.
VI. Conclusion
Baehr is a story with a hopeful ending. The Supreme Court of
Hawaii reversed the lower court's holding, and ruled that Hawaii
Revised Statutes Section 572-1, prima facie and as applied, imper-
282. Id.
283. David Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957,
1006 (1979) (footnote omitted).
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missibly categorized the issuance of marriage licenses on "sexual"
classifications, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Hawaii Constitution. Such a classification in Hawaii is subject to
"strict scrutiny" and requires the state provide compelling inter-
ests, narrowly tailored, to meet its objectives. It is unlikely that the
lower court will find such compelling interests. As a result, the
plaintiffs and other same-sex couples will likely receive the same
state sanction and rights from their unions as do heterosexual
couples. This is a great triumph in the struggle for equality for
gays and lesbians.
But there is another side to Baehr. As Baehr passes from
courtroom to case reporter, a dark cloud lingers on the horizon of
fundamental rights jurisprudence. Baehr is a dangerous precedent
which forecloses an essential avenue for defining equality under the
law. For those who are resistant to the notion of homosexual equal-
ity, and are entrenched in their homophobia, Baehr provides a de-
vice through fundamental rights analysis for the perpetuation of
their intolerance.
The malignant device employed by the Baehr court is the "tra-
ditions and collective conscience" test. This test permits the tradi-
tional fears, hatred and prejudice of a mythical majority to be the
filter through which fundamental civil liberties are defined. Appeal
to tradition and collective conscience legitimizes the hate and disen-
franchisement of the ignorant against homosexuals. As the Fram-
ers thought, judicial power is most legitimate when it holds
democratic majorities to arguments of principles and establishes in
the minds of the people truths and principles which they might
never otherwise have thought. The "traditions and collective con-
science" test does not foster jurisprudential reasoning based on
principles of liberty, rather it appeals to and privileges popular
prejudice. Jefferson and Madison did not locate the fundamental
principles of the Declaration of Independence or Constitution in the
history of our people, but rather found them within the nature of
being human.
A basic purpose of our founding charters is to ensure that the
tyrannical passions of a majority will not disparage fundamental
liberty interests enjoyed by the majority to a despised minority sim-
ply because the minority expresses themselves differently. The
test, in determining liberty interests, according to Madison, is to
determine if the minority's claimed liberty interest is in conflict
with that of the majority. If it is not, then the minority should not
be denied the same liberty interest which the majority enjoys. In
Baehr, we are given no reason why same-sex marriage conflicts
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with heterosexual marriage. Nor are we provided a reason why ho-
mosexuality renders a homosexual outside of the definition of "all
individuals" used by the Court to define marital rights. We are sim-
ply left with the circular conclusion that because history has not
allowed same-sex marriage, than same-sex marriage is impermissi-
ble. But why??
If as a gay man I am denied the same fundamental rights
granted to my heterosexual brother, I would like to be provided
with an intelligent reason. The Baehr court has not given such rea-
son, perhaps because there is none.
Postscript
This legislation amends HRS Chapter 572, to state:
Definition of marriage, Whenever used in the statutes or other
laws of Hawaii, "marriage" means the union licensed under
§ 572-1.
SECTION 3. Section 572-1, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is
amended to read as follows:
§ 572-1 Requisites of valid marriage contract. In order to
make valid the marriage contract, which shall be only between
a man and a woman, it shall be necessary that...
6) [It shall in no case be lawful for any person to marry in
the State without] The man and woman to be married in the
State shall have duly obtained a license for that purpose [duly
obtained] from the agent appointed to grant marriage licensees;
HAwAII HOUSE BILL No. 2312, pp. 13-15.
The language "man and woman" is inserted throughout the
rest of the marriage statute. By inserting this language the legisla-
ture sought to define marriage as legal only between men and wo-
men as a means to purposely exclude same-sex marriages.
The Hawaii legislature included several pages of policy state-
ment in this Act declaring that the Hawaii Supreme Court had
overstepped its authority, violating the separation of powers, in its
equal protection ruling and had impermissibly legislated same-sex
marriage from the bench. Further, the Act states that the Hawaii
Supreme Court misinterpreted the word "sex" as found in Article 1,
Section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution to include the notion of sexual
orientation. The legislature stated that sex means gender, not sex-
ual orientation. Therefore, the legislature concluded that the equal
protection analysis of the Baehr court is presented in terms of sex-
ual orientation rather than gender classifications and consequently
impermissibly expanded the intention of that word as it appears in
both the marriage statute and the Hawaii Constitution.
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The validity of this law is dubious. It is the legislature, not
the Supreme Court, which has violated the separation of powers by
this Act. It is firmly established that the Hawaii Supreme Court
has the ultimate authority to define and distinguish the meaning of
the Constitution. The legislature through this Act is attempting to
assert the power of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitu-
tion. In its equal protection analysis, there is no evidence that the
court was attempting to legislate same-sex marriage, rather the
court issued what it reasoned to be the most equitable interpreta-
tion of the Hawaii Equal Protection Clause in relation to the statute
at issue, HRS-572. This battle is obviously not over and the last
word in this case is far from certain.

